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Abstract The present paper examines the wage effects of continuous training
programs using individual-level data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP). In order to account for selectivity in training participation we estimate
average treatment effects (ATE and ATT) of general and firm-specific continuous
training programs using several state-of-the-art propensity score matching (PSM)
estimators. Additionally, we also apply a combined matching difference-in-differ-
ences (MDiD) estimator to account for unobserved individual characteristics (e.g.
motivation, ability). While the estimated ATE and ATT for general training are
significant ranging between about 4 and 7.5%, the corresponding wage effects of
firm-specific training are mostly insignificant. Using the more appropriate MDiD
estimator, however, we find a more precise and highly significant wage effect of
about 5–6%, though only for general training and not for firm-specific training.
These results are consistent with standard human capital theory insofar as general
training is associated with larger wage increases than firm-specific training. Fur-
thermore, we conclude that firms may intend to use specific training to adjust to new
job requirements, while career-relevant changes may be conditioned to general
training.
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1 Introduction
Continuous training is a very important tool of human resource management toward
adjusting to new firm requirements as caused, for example, by technological and
organizational change. It may additionally serve as a screening device of the firm to
allocate workers to jobs more efficiently or as an incentive mechanism to encourage
workers to provide some extra effort. Although continuous training can typically be
assumed to increase a worker’s productivity, this productivity effect of training does
not necessarily need to be reflected in a corresponding wage growth.1
According to the prediction of standard human capital theory, continuous training
is likely to increase post-training wages, where the wage effect of general training is
expected to exceed the corresponding wage effect of firm-specific training. Becker
(1962) has argued that generally trained workers receive the total revenue of their
human capital investment, while the costs and benefits from an investment in firm-
specific human capital are shared between employer and employee. These (sharing)
rules can be explained with different fluctuation propensities. While generally
trained workers have accumulated skills that are transferable to other firms, the
skills of specifically trained workers can only be used productively within the
training firm. Hence, generally trained workers receive wages equal to their
marginal productivity (because paying them below marginal productivity would
cause them to quit), while specifically trained workers can be paid below their
marginal productivity (without them leaving the firm). A first hypothesis for our
empirical analysis therefore is that both general and firm-specific training are
associated with positive wage increases, but the effect for general training should
exceed the corresponding effect for firm-specific training.
However, the new training literature has already developed some theoretical
arguments that provide an alternative interpretation of the relationship between
continuous training and wages. According to this literature, productivity effects of
training do not necessarily need to have a positive impact on wages (e.g. Acemoglu
and Pischke 1998, 1999a, b; Leuven 2005). For example, if the employer has excess
bargaining power, he is at least able to pay generally trained workers below their
marginal productivity, while specifically trained workers might even be paid like
untrained workers. Labour market imperfections may induce a similar effect. Since
labour market imperfections (e.g. asymmetric information, mobility costs, or wage
1 The terms ‘training’ and ‘continuous training’ are used synonymously in this paper. By continuous
training we mean the individual’s participation in job-related courses and seminars. These courses and
seminars are either conducted internally (i.e. within the firm) or outside by external institutions and
providers. Some examples of possible training measures are language courses, courses for improving
technical skills, and computer courses.
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floors) imply that generally trained workers do not receive the full marginal return
on their productivity, their post-training wage effect depends on the amount of the
employer’s investment in general training. If the employer bears all the training
costs, a generally trained worker cannot expect a significant increase in his post-
training wage. The same logic holds for specifically trained workers. According to
these considerations, a second hypothesis for our empirical investigation can be
derived: Neither generally trained workers nor specifically trained workers must
necessarily realize significant wage increases in response to their training programs.
In addition to these human capital considerations, we provide a related
explanation that is based on the particular objective behind continuous training.
For example, if firms intend to use specific training quite spontaneously to adjust to
new job requirements, these training programs aim at avoiding productivity declines
rather than increasing productivity. As a consequence, post-training wages cannot
be expected to differ significantly from pre-training wages. On the other hand, if
firms intend to apply general training programs systematically, these programs may
also be seen as an instrument of the firms’ long-term career policy. In this case,
post-training wages might significantly exceed pre-training wages.
The effects of continuous training on wages have previously been investigated in
several empirical studies.2 However, the empirical results are quite ambiguous,
which can at least partially be attributed to the application of different data sets and
estimation strategies. The international evidence mainly stems from the US and
Canada (see e.g. Lynch 1992; Veum 1995; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998, 1999;
Parent 1999, 2003; Frazis and Loewenstein 2003). Nearly all of these studies
account for heterogeneity by applying Heckman selectivity correction or fixed
effects estimators. Their resulting wage effects of training vary between 0.2 and
3.9%. Considering European research, there is a comparatively large stock of
studies using UK data (e.g. Booth 1991, 1993; Blundell et al. 1996, 1999;
Arulampalam and Booth 2001). Applying various estimation techniques (OLS, fixed
effects, quasi-differences, selection correction and instrumental variables) these
studies find wage effects between 1 and 11% for male workers.3
Meanwhile, there are several empirical studies on the wage effects of continuous
training using German data sets. Almost all of these investigations explicitly address
the potential selectivity problem, which arises from not accounting for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity between training participants and non-participants (e.g.
Bu¨chel and Pannenberg 2004; Pischke 2001; Garloff and Kuckulenz 2006;
Kuckulenz and Maier 2006; Kuckulenz and Zwick 2003, 2005; Ju¨rges and
Schneider 2006). Some of these studies are based on instrumental variables (IV)
estimations. The drawback of theses studies is that IV approaches require relevant
and valid instruments for continuous training. Otherwise, the coefficients are likely
to be biased and inconsistent. As a consequence, the estimated wage effects of
continuous training resulting from IV approaches are often inflated with respect to
2 Valuable surveys on the effects of training on wages are provided by Bishop (1997) and Leuven (2004).
3 Evidence for other European countries is rather sparse. See for France Goux and Maurin (2000), for
Norway Schøne (2002), for Switzerland Gerfin (2004) and Gerfin et al. (2003), for the Netherlands
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002), and for Portugal Budria and Pereira (2004).
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magnitude and standard errors, which makes an interpretation quite difficult.4 On
the contrary, other studies that do not rely on IV estimates report quite small and
often insignificant wage effects of continuous training. These studies consider that
selection into training might be driven by observed and unobserved characteristics
(e.g. motivation and ability). For example, applying a fixed growth model Pischke
(2001) finds that selection into training is due to wage growth rather than wage
levels and that workers with higher wage growth participate more often in training
measures. Finally, Ju¨rges and Schneider (2006) focus on the comparison of different
estimation techniques (Hausman-Taylor model, fixed-growth estimator and match-
ing combined with difference-in-differences) using the calendar information of the
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and do not find a significant causal effect
of training on wages. Therefore, the conclusion is that the supposed returns to
continuous training are actually returns to unobserved heterogeneity.
The objective of our study is to add to the existing literature in the following way. In
contrast to the vast majority of empirical studies, we focus on the wage effects of
continuous training, separated by general and firm-specific training programs. This
distinction is of major importance as human capital theory predicts different wage
effects for both kinds of training. To our knowledge only a few papers study the effects
of training on wages, allowing for different forms of training to occur. Lynch (1992)
distinguishes between private sector on-the-job training, apprenticeship and off-the-
job training. Although the effects are complex, all three types are associated with
higher wages. Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) separate external training (e.g. seminars
and visiting trade fairs) from internal training (e.g. on-the-job training and special
tasks). They find that external training yields significantly positive wage effects
whereas internal training remains insignificant. The authors attribute this result to the
higher share of firm-specific content in internal training measures where only the
employer skims the productivity gains. Gerfin (2004) separates firm-sponsored
training from any other work-related training. He finds a quite moderate wage effect of
work-related training of about 2% and an insignificant effect of firm-sponsored
training. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) have to use a proxy for general training.
They find that training pays-off more for employees who switch their employer. One
study that analyses firm-sponsored training is the paper of Schøne (2004). He finds that
Norwegian firms mainly finance training of general skills, which has a positive impact
on wages of the employees. Only Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) focus directly on
the distinction between general and firm-specific on-the-job training. Applying OLS
regressions they find an effect of continuous training on wages 4.4–6.2% (depending
on whether or not the employee switches the employer). This effect decreases to 1.4%
if fixed-effects estimation is applied. However, the authors do not find that the wage
increase depends on whether the skills acquired are general or firm-specific.
In our study, we use the data of the GSOEP and apply some state-of-the-art
nonparametric matching estimators that explicitly account for observed and unob-
served heterogeneity between training participants and non-participants. These
matching approaches are based on the estimation of propensity scores (PSM
4 Sometimes the estimated wage effects of continuous training appear to be quite unrealistic with respect
to magnitude ranging from –62.5 to 52.9% (see e.g. Budria and Pereira 2004).
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estimators). More precisely, we first apply nearest neighbour matching, kernel
matching, and local linear regression matching to evaluate the wage effects of
continuous training programs in Germany. Since these matching approaches only
account for selectivity that can be attributed to observed individual characteristics (e.g.
age or education) but not for unobserved differences between training participants and
non-participants (e.g. differences in ability and motivation), the estimated effect of
continuous training on wages might not be causal. Therefore, we additionally account
for unobservable characteristics combining matching with a difference-in-differences
estimation strategy (MDiD). The idea of the MDiD approach is to match training
participants and non-participants according to observable characteristics and then to
compare their wage developments. This approach allows us to control for time
invariant heterogeneity that was not captured by the matching and thus contributes to
our objective to estimate a causal effect of continuous training on wages.
In our contribution we go further than the above mentioned fixed-growth models
applied, for example, in Pischke (2001), which calculate individual but fixed growth
rates of wages. Furthermore, we extend the MDiD results, as obtained, for example,
in Ju¨rges and Schneider (2006) by estimating separate effects for general and firm-
specific training. In our opinion, the most related study to our paper is Gerfin (2004),
who also applies the MDiD approach using data from the Swiss Labour Force
Survey and distinguishing between firm-sponsored and work-related training.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides the data, variables and
descriptive statistics. In Sect. 3, we introduce our econometric modelling. Section 4
contains the empirical results of the reference OLS estimator, the matching
estimators including our preferred MDiD approach and some robustness checks.
Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on the year 2000 and 2004 waves of the GSOEP.
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private households in Germany. Launched in
1984, the study has been surveying households annually. The panel offers
information on German citizens and immigrants living in the eastern or western
parts of Germany. The GSOEP data cover a wide range of areas including the
individual’s traits, biography, employment status, career, professional mobility,
earnings, education, training, family, health, satisfaction, household composition
and living situation making it one of the most commonly used individual-level data
sets in Germany (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005 for further details).
Our main variable of interest is participation in continuous training. The
questionnaire allows us to examine the wage effects of three main treatments:
continuous training (CT) which can further be separated into general training (GT)
and firm-specific training (FST). Individuals were firstly asked about the sources
they use for continuous training. Possible responses are regularly reading scientific
or professional publications, attending professional conferences and participating in
professionally orientated courses and seminars. We use the information on this last
item to generate our variable for continuous training.
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This item simultaneously works as a filter for the subsequent questions on job-
related training participation within the last 3 years. Regarding our research
question we are interested in the information whether or not continuously trained
individuals would be able to transfer the skills and abilities acquired during the
training to another employer. The possible responses are: (a) not at all, (b) limitedly,
(c) dominantly, (d) completely. We create dummy variables for firm-specific and
general training, defining responses (a) and (b) as an indication of firm-specific
training and responses (c) and (d) as an indication of general training.5
In the panel wave of 2004 respondents could collectively name three training
courses they participated in during the last 3 years. We choose to use the
information of the middle of these courses, as the latest course might still be lasting
and the least recent course has probably been attended quite a long time ago.6 In
both panel waves, 2000 and 2004, continuous training has been one of the major
topics. Since respondents are asked for information covering the last 3 years, our
treatment period of interest ranges from 2001 to 2003. Thus, we can use the pre-
treatment characteristics from the year 2000 questionnaire and the post-treatment
characteristics from the wave of 2004.
Our outcome variable of interest is the individual’s current gross monthly
income.7 We restrict our sample to male workers to avoid another selectivity
problem resulting from the a priori decision problem by women whether or not to
participate in the labour market. To achieve unambiguous results we do furthermore
not consider part-time workers, self-employed, apprentices, and public servants. We
control for individual characteristics (years of education, marital status, nationality,
age), job-related factors (tenure, fixed-term employment, overtime work, working in
the certified job, occupational status), firm size, sector affiliation and region (see
Table 6 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the variables).
Thus, our sample consists of 1,751 individuals, where 426 receive continuous
training and 1,325 do not. Table 1 displays the mean values of the dependent
variable and some of the explanatory variables, separated for both groups. This
comparative analysis provides first insights on specific differences between
continuously trained and untrained workers and allows us to obtain information
on the determination of continuous training.
The results show the expected correlation between continuous training and
increasing wages. According to the calculated means, trained workers earn on
average about 800 Euros more per month than untrained workers. Of course, this
preliminary finding is not very meaningful unless one controls for additional
heterogeneity using multiple regression analysis. Our preliminary findings further-
more suggest substantial differences with respect to other characteristics. For
example, continuously trained workers are slightly younger than untrained workers.
They are also better educated, which is indicated by the higher amount of years of
5 See Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) for an analogous approach using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY).
6 However, we use the data of the least recent training course in one of our robustness checks in Sect. 4.
7 We use the natural logarithm of this income and exclude responses below 600 Euros to avoid
implausible information in our sample of full-time employed males.
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schooling. This result is consistent with the commonly accepted finding that skilled
or better educated employees are more likely to participate in training programs
than less-skilled employees (e.g. Du¨ll and Bellmann 1999).8 Moreover, continu-
ously trained workers are more likely to provide extra working time, and work more
often in their certified job. Finally, fixed-term workers and workers of non-German
origin are less likely to participate in continuous training programs. The descriptive
evidence will be further investigated in the next section.
3 Econometric modelling
Our estimation strategy proceeds in three steps. First, we specify Mincer-type wage
functions to evaluate the wage effect of continuous training on wages using the
usual OLS procedure.9 In order to account for a possible selectivity bias arising
from the fact that OLS ignores the endogeneity of continuous training participation,
our second approach is to estimate an average treatment effect applying several
matching methods based on propensity scores. However, as this strategy might not
eliminate a bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, we thirdly estimate the
effect of continuous training on wages using a difference-in-differences estimator
Table 1 Continuously trained versus untrained workers: mean values of selected variables
Variable Means for continuously
trained workers
Means for untrained
workers
Gross wage per month (W) 3,753.29 2,943.89
Years of education (S) 13.21 11.86
Worker’s age (AGE) 41.87 43.81
Tenure (TEN) 11.84 12.67
Unmarried (UNMARRIED) 0.20 0.15
Nationality (NATION) 0.94 0.87
Fixed-term worker (FTE) 0.03 0.04
Adequate job (AD_JOB) 0.62 0.55
Overtime work (O_TIME) 4.03 2.64
West German (WEST) 0.81 0.76
N 426 1,325
The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent
regression analysis. The means of the wage variable W are measured in Euro. UNMARRIED, NATION,
FTE, AD_JOB, and WEST are dummy variables. Thus, the means display the fraction of individuals
belonging to that certain feature. N indicates sample size
Source German Socio Economic Panel (wave 2004), own calculations
8 The results remain unchanged when using educational degree instead of years of schooling.
9 In the standard Mincer wage function, log wages is regressed on education and job experience (original
and squared observations). The Mincer wage function is based upon the schooling function that assumes
an exponential relation between wages and the years of schooling. For further details, see Mincer (1974),
Chiswick (2003), and Heckman et al. (2006).
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on the matched sample (MDiD). Finally, we perform several robustness checks to
assess the sensitivity of our results.
3.1 OLS estimation
Our econometric model has the general form
ln Wi ¼ a0 þ a1Si þ a2TENi þ a3 TENið Þ2 þ cCTi þ d0Xi þ vi; ð1Þ
where ln Wi is the natural logarithm of gross monthly wages, Si is the years of
education and TENi is tenure of individual i.
10 CT is a dummy variable that
separates employees who recently received continuous training from those who
have not. Xi is a vector containing individual socio-demographic characteristics,
job-related factors, information on working conditions and occupational status, and
other control variables. Finally, ai, c and d represent the coefficients to be estimated,
and mi is a stochastic error term with the usual assumptions, i.e., normal distribution,
zero mean, and finite variance.
Since the available data allow us to distinguish between the wage effects of
general training and firm-specific training, Eq. 1 can be modified to
ln Wi ¼ bg0 þ bg1Si þ bg2TENi þ bg3 TENið Þ2 þ cgGTi þ d0gXi þ vgi; ð2Þ
or
ln Wi ¼ bf 0 þ bf 1Si þ bf 2TENi þ bf 3 TENið Þ2 þ cf FSTi þ d0f Xi þ vfi; ð3Þ
where GTi (FSTi) is a dummy variable that separates employees who have received
general training (firm-specific training) within the last 3 years from those who have
not received any continuous training within that time span. In the absence of
selection problems with respect to training participation, the training coefficients c,
cg, and cf in specifications (1)–(3) can consistently be estimated using the
conventional OLS procedure.
Importantly, the decision process whether or not to participate in a continuous
training program is usually endogenous. Not accounting for the selection decision of
employee and employer is typically associated with biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates. More precisely, the wage effect, which has falsely been
attributed to continuous training, can be driven by individual and firm character-
istics influencing the probability of participating in a training program and not by
continuous training itself.
10 We use tenure instead of total working experience. The reason for this proceeding is that experience
cannot directly be observed in our data. We would have to approximate experience by individual’s age
minus years of schooling minus 6 (the age at which children usually start schooling in Germany), which is
a relatively imprecise measure of effective working experience.
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3.2 Propensity score matching
In order to account for a potential selectivity bias, our second approach is the
estimation of an average treatment effect by comparing trained and untrained
individuals (see e.g. Heckman et al. 1997). Thus, the main requirement is to
construct an adequate control group in a way that the only remaining difference
between both groups is participation in training (e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias 2002;
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2006). The average treatment effect for the population
(ATE) describes the difference of the expected outcomes after training participation
and non-participation and is defined as
DATE ¼ EðDÞ ¼ Eðln W1Þ  Eðln W0Þ: ð4Þ
Here, Eðln W1Þ is the expected log-wage for participants and Eðln W0Þ the
corresponding expected value for non-participants. The drawback of the ATE is that it
includes the effect on individuals for whom the treatment, i.e. the training program,
was never intended. Therefore, the more prominent evaluation parameter is the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which explicitly concentrates on the
wage effects on those individuals for whom the training program is actually intended.
The ATT is defined as the difference between the expected outcomes with and without
participation in continuous training for the effective treatment participants:
DATT ¼ E DjCT ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E ln W1jCT ¼ 1
  E ln W0jCT ¼ 1 : ð5Þ
The second term on the right hand side of Eq. 5 describes a hypothetical outcome
without treatment for individuals who actually received treatment and is therefore
unobservable. Under the condition that E ln W0jCT ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E ln W0jCT ¼ 0ð Þ; the
non-participants serve as an adequate control group.
This condition only holds if two main assumptions are fulfilled. First, the
individuals are selected into treatment solely according to observable pre-treatment
characteristics and the outcomes of non-participants would be the same if they were
trained instead (Conditional Independence Assumption). This is a fairly strong
assumption as our data do not contain variables for individual motivation or ability,
which are likely to affect the selection into treatment and wages. However, due to
the fact that we have the information on training participation for both years, 2000
and 2004, we are able to use former (year 2000 training participation) as a proxy for
the general attitude of individuals towards training. Thus, we can match individuals
who participate in training in the year 2004 to non-participants in 2004 with respect
to the information whether or not these individuals have already participated in
continuous training in 2000.
The second necessary assumption is a positive probability to be in the treatment or
in the control group to avoid comparing non-comparable individuals (Common
Support Assumption). This assumption might be critical if programs are directed to
certain groups of employees. However, as our sample is restricted to full-time
employed male workers, the Common Support Assumptions is not unlikely to hold.
Since conditioning on a high-dimensional vector of observable characteristics is
difficult, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and match on the treatment
probability P(Z), where Z contains the pre-treatment characteristics:
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E ln W0jCT ¼ 1; PðZÞ  ¼ E ln W0jCT ¼ 0; PðZÞ : ð6Þ
Since we distinguish three different treatments, we can match conditional on the
probability to participate in continuous training, general or firm-specific training.
Thus, we firstly estimate the propensity score and subsequently implement our
matching estimator of choice. The propensity score matching (PSM) estimator for
the ATT can then be written as
DPSMATT ¼
X
i2T
Wi 
X
j2C
Ki;jWj
( )
ki: ð7Þ
Here, Wi is the wage of the training participants, Wj is the wage of the non-
participants, and T and C indicate treatment and control group. Ki;j is the weight
placed on comparison observation j for individual i.11 Finally, ki reconstructs the
outcome of the treated sample by re-weighting, for example, with equal weights to
all observations or kernel weights (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002).12 Hence, the
PSM estimator is the mean difference in wage outcomes over the common support,
appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of training participants
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2006).
The PSM approach estimates the ATT or the ATE, respectively, applying a two-
step procedure. In the first step, the propensity score is estimated. For this purpose, a
binary choice model for CT (GT, FST) with the covariates is estimated using the
probit maximum likelihood method. In the second step, the wage effect of CT (GT,
FST) is estimated using matching techniques based on propensity score estimation.
Specifically, we implement nearest neighbour matching, kernel matching and local
linear regression matching.13
The most straightforward propensity score matching method is nearest neighbour
matching (Heckman et al. 1999; Lechner 1998). The idea of nearest neighbour
matching is to find for each treated individual a corresponding matching partner,
i.e., a particular non-treated individual with the closest propensity score. We
decided to use four matches for the nearest neighbour because we have a relative
large group of controls compared to the number of treated individuals. Moreover,
using four matches was found to perform well in terms of mean-squared error
(Abadie and Imbens 2002; Abadie et al. 2004). In addition, we allow for
replacement because this proceeding preserves us from relying on too little
information and incorporating observations that are not sufficiently similar (Smith
1997). Matching with replacement (i.e. one control individual can be matched to
more than one of the treated) is less beneficial than matching without replacement in
11 In our analysis, we use kernel weights to account for the closeness in outcomes of participants and
non-participants.
12 Re-weighting is necessary if the group of the treated individuals is larger than the group of controls
due to oversampling of treated individuals. As this is not the case in our GSOEP data, we do not re-weight
the sample.
13 These matching estimators are commonly used in evaluative studies and are extensively described, for
example, in Blundell and Costa Dias (2002), Blundell et al. (2005), Caliendo and Hujer (2006), Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2006), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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terms of variance. However, it is more beneficial in terms of bias, and so matching
with replacement is our preferred matching strategy.
Kernel matching (see Heckman et al. 1998 for details) and local linear regression
matching represent nonparametric matching estimators that use weighted averages
of (almost) all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual
outcome.14 Hence, an advantage of these methods is the relative small variance
resulting from the fact that more information is used. However, one drawback is that
observations might be used that are bad matches. In principle, kernel matching is a
weighted regression of the counterfactual outcome on an intercept with weights
given by the kernel weights. These weights depend on the distance between each
control group member and the participant observation for which the counterfactual
is estimated. The difference between kernel matching and local linear regression
matching is that the latter does not only include the intercept but also a linear term
in the propensity score of a treated individual.
Kernel matching and local linear regression matching require choosing the kernel
function and the bandwidth parameter. While the choice of the kernel function is not
of major importance in practice, the choice of the bandwidth parameter involves a
trade off between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the true density
function. Large bandwidth values tend to decrease the variance between the estimated
and the true density function but lead to a biased estimate (Caliendo and Kopeinig
2006). We chose the default Epanechnikov kernel function and a default bandwidth
parameter of 0.06 for kernel matching, and the default tricube kernel function and a
default bandwidth parameter of 0.8 for local linear regression matching.
The major weakness of the matching approach is that selection into training (and
the wage effects as well) can only be ascribed to observed individual and firm
characteristics. However, the training decision is likely to be driven by unobservable
characteristics, too. In this case, the Conditional Independence Assumption is
unlikely to hold. As a consequence, matching reduces but does not completely
eliminate selection bias.15
3.3 Combined matching difference-in-differences estimator
Our idea of additionally controlling for previous participation in continuous training
might probably not suffice to satisfy the Conditional Independence Assumption.
Specifically, unobserved characteristics, for example, differences in ability or
motivation between training participants and non-participants, are unlikely to be
completely captured by an explanatory variable for previous training participation.
Since these characteristics are time-invariant, the matching difference-in-differ-
ences estimator (MDiD) compares the conditional before treatment-after treatment
wages of the trained individuals to those of the untrained to control for remaining
14 The question of whether all or almost all individuals in the control group are used depends on the
choice of the kernel function (Calienedo and Kopeinig 2006).
15 This bias does not completely diminish because due to unobserved characteristics training participants
and non-participants are selected groups earning different wages, even in the absence of continuous
training programs.
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unobservable differences (see e.g. Heckman et al. 1998; Blundell and Costa Dias
2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2006).
The combination of matching with a DiD approach extends the method of
matching by ruling out the unobserved heterogeneity which is still present. The
MDiD estimator (or Conditional DiD estimator) is obtained by comparing the mean
outcomes of participants with the corresponding outcomes of their matched
counterparts. Extending Eq. 7, the MDiD estimator can be written as
DMDiDATT ¼
X
i2T
ðWit1  Wit0Þ 
X
j2C
Ki;jðWjt1  Wjt0Þ
( )
ki; ð8Þ
where t1 and t0 are time indices. The estimator is superior to DiD as it does not
impose linear functional form restrictions and superior to matching as it relaxes the
Conditional Independence Assumption and allows for unobservable, time invariant
differences in the outcomes between training participants and non-participants
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2006). The key assumption regarding the use of this
estimator is that common time trends apply for both treated individuals and matched
controls. By comparing pre- and post-training wages we additionally need to assume
that the wages of the matched non-participants evolve the same way than the wages
of the training participants if they had not been trained.16
4 Empirical results
4.1 OLS estimation
The first step in our empirical strategy is the estimation of a Mincer-type wage
function using the cross-sectional data of the year 2004. The results of the usual OLS
estimation of Eqs. 1–3 are summarized in Table 2. We run separate regressions for
our three types of training, namely continuous training, general and firm specific
training. Thereby, Panel A displays the results of a typical Mincer wage function
augmented by our variable for continuous training (CT, GT, or FST) and a set of
common control variables for marital status, nationality, fixed-term employment,
firm size, sector affiliation and region. Panel B additionally accounts for the
occupational status of the individuals, overtime work and working in the certified job.
The estimates of all control variables are summarized in Table 8 in the Appendix.
Panel A shows similar results for all three types of training. The participation in
continuous training is associated with a significant increase in wages of 9.4%. For
general training the effect is slightly higher (9.7%) and for firm specific training
somewhat lower (7.8%). The impact of the variables for education and tenure is
similar in all three equations.
Additionally controlling for occupational status and further job characteristics,
we find that continuous training is no longer associated with significant wage
increases. Thus, the wage effects of our training measures are quite sensitive to
model specification. The wage effects of schooling reduce as well when moving
16 We performed robustness checks on that. See Sect. 4 for details.
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from the Panel A to the Panel B specification. More precisely, the schooling effect
declines from about 7% in Panel A to about 2% in Panel B, but is still highly
significant. All estimates of our control variables are significant with the anticipated
sign, except the variables indicating working in the certified job and nationality,
which are both insignificant (see Table 8 in the Appendix).17 The remaining results
can be summarized as follows: unmarried workers earn less than married workers,
fixed-term workers earn less than permanent workers, and West German workers
earn more than their East German counterparts. Moreover, there are highly
significant skill and hierarchical wage effects indicated by our controls for
occupational status. Finally, we observe the well-known firm size wage differential.
As previously been mentioned, the OLS estimates do not account for the
endogenous decision to participate in continuous training programs.18 For example,
Table 2 OLS wage effects of different forms of continuous training
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Panel A
S 0.067*** (19.12) 0.067*** (17.80) 0.069*** (17.31)
TEN 0.010*** (3.84) 0.010*** (3.94) 0.009*** (3.14)
(TEN)2*100 –0.016** (–2.46) –0.017*** (–2.57) –0.013* (–1.91)
CT 0.094*** (4.80)
GT 0.097*** (4.18)
FST 0.078*** (2.78)
Panel B: Panel A + occupational status + overtime work + adequate job
S 0.020*** (5.47) 0.018*** (4.58) 0.021*** (4.92)
TEN 0.008*** (3.87) 0.009*** (4.19) 0.007*** (2.73)
(TEN)2*100 –0.015*** (–2.65) –0.018*** (–3.06) –0.011* (–1.77)
CT 0.015 (0.90)
GT 0.008 (0.42)
FST 0.021 (0.88)
F test 68.48*** 60.43*** 52.08***
R2 0.632 0.629 0.621
N 1,751 1,604 1,472
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The dependent variable is log W. The coef-
ficients in Panels A and B are estimated by OLS. The values in parentheses represent the robust t-statistics
using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients. The basic model in Panel A
additionally contains control variables for fixed-term workers, nationality, marital status, West-German
workers, five firm size dummies, ten sector dummies and 15 regional dummies. The F test and R2 indicate
the estimation quality of the equations. N indicates sample size. All the latter statistics refer to Panel B
Source German Socio Economic Panel (wave 2004), own calculations
17 The effects of the sector and regional dummies are not displayed in the Appendix. They are available
from the authors upon request. Both sets of dummies show mostly insignificant coefficients.
18 The fact that we observe relatively volatile wage effects of our measures for continuous training (and
schooling), while the coefficients for our control variables remain quite stable in different model
specifications, may not solely indicate an omitted variables bias. It can also be viewed as an indication for
a selectivity bias.
The returns to continuous training in Germany 221
123
better educated and younger workers as well as workers in skilled occupations may
be more likely to attend continuous training. Therefore, our estimation results might
be biased. This weakness can be rectified by using propensity score matching
estimators instead of the usual OLS method.
4.2 Propensity score matching
One solution to overcome the selection bias is matching. We thus compare the
wages of individuals who participate in continuous training to a group of people
who do not participate in the treatment. To establish an adequate control group we
have to match individuals according to pre-treatment characteristics. To obtain this
information we go 4 years backwards and use the information of the wave 2000
questionnaire of the GSOEP. Since the respondents are asked in 2004 to review the
last 3 years when answering the question, whether or not they participated in some
sort of continuous training, we can use characteristics prior to this treatment.
We obtain the matching variables starting again with the classical Mincer
explanatory variables and controls for regional differences. We use age instead of
tenure and renounce the squared term as this term does not predict participation in
training on a statistically significant level. The further matching variables are
selected on the criterion of statistical significance when adding them iteratively to
our baseline specification, which consists of a constant and age. Since we also aim at
matching on the information of occupational status but do only have relatively few
observations for managers and unskilled white collar workers (see Table 7 in the
Appendix for the variable means), we combine the information on occupational
status into three variables indicating unskilled work (US), skilled work (SK) and
high-skilled occupations (HS).19 Table 9 in the Appendix displays the results from a
probit model of participation in continuous training as a function of pre-training
characteristics.
Moving to a panel setting we can make use of additional information, which we
could not use in the OLS regressions. Since continuous training is also a major topic
in the year 2000 questionnaire, we are able to use the information whether or not the
respondents have already participated in some job-related training in the 3 years
prior to the year 2000 specifying our variable PT.20 This allows us to distinguish
between individuals, which show a high affiliation to training arrangements from
those who do not.
We apply three matching procedures, nearest neighbour matching, kernel
matching and local linear regression and ensure common support by dropping
treatment observations, whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or
19 HS is a dummy variable, which equals one when the individual executes high-skilled white collar
work or managerial activities. The variable SK equals one if the individual executes skilled blue or white
collar work. The reference category is US which is equal to one if the individual executes unskilled blue
or white collar work.
20 The variable we use to get this information is the same as in the 2004 questionnaire. See Sect. 2 for
details. We again regard individuals as participants in continuous training when they stated to have
participated in professionally oriented courses.
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lower than the minimum propensity score of the controls. The means of the
treatment group, control group and matched controls are displayed in Table 3.21
According to these results, the means for training participants are quite close to the
corresponding means of their matched counterparts and quite different from the
means of the non-participants.
Table 4 displays the ATE and the ATT resulting from the three different
matching methods. The estimates for the ATE show that the global wage effect of
continuous training ranges in the interval between 4.7 and 5.9%. Hence, the
magnitude of this wage effect lies in the middle of the wage effects resulting from
our first and second (insignificant) OLS estimates. However, it is much more
interesting to interpret the separate wage effects of general and firm-specific
training. For general training both the ATE and the ATT provide significant wage
effects ranging between 4.1 and 7.5%. The corresponding wage effects of firm-
specific training (ATE and ATT) are mostly insignificant. Finally, the ATT
estimates are somewhat smaller than the ATE estimates indicating that continuous
training is typically not directed to the workforce as a whole but to some selected
kinds of employees.
The major weakness of the matching approach is that only observable character-
istics are allowed to influence the selection into training and to affect wages. Even the
Table 3 Means of variables in subgroups
Variable All Training
participants
Non-participants Matched
non-participants
Gross wage per month (W) 2,731.94 3,166.28 2,592.29 2,855.20
Years of education (S) 12.16 13.17 11.84 12.45
Worker’s age (AGE) 39.34 37.87 39.81 38.20
Tenure (TEN) 9.95 9.48 10.11 9.53
Unmarried (UNMARRIED) 0.21 0.26 0.20 0.24
Nationality (NATION) 0.89 0.94 0.87 0.91
Fixed-term worker (FTE) 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
Adequate job (AD_JOB) 0.59 0.65 0.57 0.65
Overtime work (O_TIME) 3.43 4.24 3.17 3.46
West German (WEST) 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.79
Skilled work (SK) 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.60
High skilled work (HS) 0.23 0.41 0.17 0.27
N 1,751 426 1,325 608
These are the pre-treatment characteristics, i.e. the variables refer to the year 2000 wave of the GSOEP
and thus the means differ from the corresponding values obtained for the year 2004. The matched non-
participants are drawn from nearest neighbour matching for CT, allowing for replacement and using the
four closest matches. N indicates sample size
Source German Socio Economic Panel (wave 2000), own calculations
21 Plotting the density of the propensity score distribution reveals that the treated and control individuals
differ. Especially in the higher propensity scores we have a quite substantial amount of treated
observations but relatively few controls. Nevertheless, we can assure common support.
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application of such a rich data set like the GSOEP does not guarantee that all the
heterogeneity between participants and non-participants can be captured sufficiently.
Rather, matching procedures are likely to capture observed individual characteristics,
while they are not able to account for unobserved characteristics. Therefore, matching
reduces but does not eliminate the selection bias.
4.3 Combined matching difference-in-differences estimator
The bias caused by time invariant unobservable characteristics is removed by
combining matching with a difference-in-differences estimator (MDiD). The MDiD
estimator can be obtained by regressing the difference in log-wages between 2004
and 2000 on a dummy variable indicating participation in continuous training and a
constant, using the matched sample.22 The results from this regression are shown in
Table 5.
Table 4 Average treatment effects for different forms of continuous training on wages
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Treatment variable CT GT FST
Matching method ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT
Nearest neighbour 0.053** 0.036 0.066* 0.052* 0.045 –0.007
(0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.047) (0.048)
Kernel 0.059*** 0.044** 0.075*** 0.051** 0.064* 0.029
(0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039) (0.028)
Local linear regression 0.047*** 0.035 0.063** 0.041* 0.053 0.015
(0.017) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.043) (0.029)
Treated 426 279 147
N 1,751 1,604 1,443
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The values in parentheses represent the
bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficients. The number of bootstrap replications to be performed is
50 for the kernel matching procedure and 200 for the nearest neighbour and local linear regression
matching estimators. Fifty to two hundreds replications are typically adequate for standard error estimates
(Mooney and Duval 1993). For nearest neighbour matching the number of matches is 4. The used control
variables to estimate the propensity scores are displayed in Table 9 in the Appendix. We impose common
support by dropping treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less
than the minimum propensity score of the controls. N indicates sample size. The number of observations
for firm-specific training declines by 29 observations compared to the number given in Table 2 as one of
the regional dummies causes perfectly predicted failure
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
22 The matched non-participants are drawn by performing the nearest neighbour matching as before (four
nearest neighbours, replacement) for our three variables of interest.
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The MDiD estimates are 4.9% for continuous training as a whole and 6.1% for
general training. Both wage effects are highly significant. As expected, they are
slightly smaller than the ATE estimates because MDiD eliminates the upward bias,
which has previously been caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Firm-specific
training is associated with a wage growth of 1.8%, but this effect is again
insignificant.23
4.4 Robustness checks
To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to variable specifications and
estimation techniques we perform four robustness checks. First, we redefine the
variables for firm-specific and general training. Second, we check if our results also
hold true for the third training course respondents could mention.24 A third
robustness check is exclusively dedicated to the MDiD estimation, where we check
the sensitivity of the results when generating the matched sample by another than
the nearest neighbour matching procedure. Finally, we check whether our estimates
may be affected by temporary dips in wages that can be observed directly before
training participation.
Table 5 MDiD estimators
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Treatment variable CT GT FST
0.049*** 0.061*** 0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022)
N 1,034 777 483
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The values in parentheses represent the
standard errors of the coefficients. The matched sample is obtained by performing nearest neighbour
matching with replacement and using the four nearest neighbours. N indicates the sample size
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
23 Alternatively, one may argue that differences in prosperity between firms affect their motivation to
provide general or firm-specific training. Specifically, general training may be more likely to be offered
by prosperous firms (e.g. as a kind of bonus), while firm-specific training may be offered by firms
regardless whether they prosper or not. As a consequence, prosper firms offering general training may be
more likely to pay higher wages than less prosper firms, which tend to offer firm-specific training.
Although we are not able to explicitly control for establishment prosperity, we address this issue
indirectly by controlling for firm size and regional affiliation.
24 We decided not to use the first training course respondents could name, neither for the analysis nor for
the sensitivity check. Here, the individuals are explicitly asked for the most recent or current course and
we do not expect to see wage effects from that training, mostly because of the fact that this course may
just have been finished or might even last.
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We perform a first robustness check by redefining our variables GT and FST
restricting general training to acquired knowledge that is completely transferable
and firm specific training to knowledge that is not transferable at all. The matching
estimations for both general and firm specific training are mostly insignificant, while
the MDiD estimator for general training is 6.2% and significant at the 5% level.
Thus, the wage effect has a similar magnitude like our estimate presented above.
The results are displayed in Table 10 in the Appendix.
Second, we check whether the results change when performing the analysis with
the furthermost training course respondents could name. Thereby, our number of
observations drops to 199 treated individuals for general training and 107 treated
observations for firm-specific training. Table 11 in the Appendix displays the
results. The results from the matching procedures are mixed and only partially
significant. The effects from the MDiD are comparable to what we have obtained
before. The wage effect for general training is 4.9% and significant at the 5% level,
and even the wage effect of firm-specific training (4.4%) is weakly significant in this
specification.
We carry out a third robustness check to test whether the results for our MDiD
estimates are sensitive to the matching procedure used to establish the matched
sample. Since the DiD estimator requires a quasi-experimental setting, we need to
assure the adequacy of our control group and the comparability of treated and
matched control individuals. Table 12 in the Appendix displays the results of the
MDiD estimators for the two other types of matching. The results strongly support
our previously estimated wage effects. More precisely, the effect sizes of nearest
neighbour matching, kernel matching and local linear regression are quite similar
ranging between significant 4.8 and 6.4% for general training. Hence, our results do
not depend on the underlying matching procedure.
As a final important robustness check we have to exclude the possibility that
anticipation effects or temporary individual-specific effects, which contribute to
increase post-training wages, significantly affect our estimated wage effects. The
literature often calls this phenomenon ‘‘Ashenfelter’s Dip’’ (Ashenfelter 1978;
Ashenfelter and Card 1985). If temporary dips in wages occurred shortly before
training participation, a faster growth in earnings would then be expected even
without the treatment. However, the wage developments of training participants,
non-participants and matched-controls show that temporary dips do obviously not
exist (see Fig. 1 and Table 13 in the Appendix). However, we must admit that our
conclusion would be even more convincing, if the GSOEP provided monthly wage
data rather than yearly data.
All in all, the robustness checks show that our estimated wage effects are not
sensitive to variable definitions or the applied matching approach.
5 Conclusion
The present paper examines the wage effects of continuous training programs using
individual-level data from the GSOEP. According to standard human capital theory,
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continuous training is expected to increase workers’ productivity and thus their
wages, where general training should be associated with larger wage gains than
firm-specific training. On the contrary, the new training literature allows for an
alternative interpretation of the relationship between continuous training and wages,
where productivity effects of training do not necessarily need to have a positive
impact on wages. Previous investigations of the wage effects of continuous training
provide very mixed results, largely depending on the applied data and econometric
methods.
Therefore, our bid to add to the empirical literature is twofold. First, we
differentiate between the wage effects of general and firm-specific training in
Germany. Second, our estimation approach explicitly accounts for a potential
selectivity bias caused by observed and unobserved heterogeneity between training
participants and non-participants. Thereby, we at first estimate average treatment
effects (ATE and ATT) of general and firm-specific continuous training programs
using nearest neighbour matching, kernel matching, and local linear regression
matching, which are all based on the estimation of propensity scores. Since these
PSM estimators just eliminate a selectivity bias that is due to observable individual
characteristics, we also apply a combined matching difference-in-differences
estimator (MDiD) to explicitly account for unobserved differences between training
participants and non-participants (e.g. motivation, ability).
Our results can be summarized as follows: while the estimated ATE and ATT
for general training are significant ranging between about 4 and 7.5%, the
corresponding wage effects of firm-specific training are mostly insignificant. Using
the more appropriate MDiD estimator, however, we find a more precise and
highly significant wage effect of about 5–6%, though only for general training and
not for firm-specific training. These results are consistent with standard human
capital theory insofar as general training is associated with larger wage increases
than firm-specific training. Furthermore, we conclude that firms may intend to use
specific training to adjust to new job requirements in order to prevent productivity
declines, while career-relevant changes may preliminarily be conditioned to
general training.
Our estimations provide some new results and thus add to the existing literature
of the wage effects of continuous training. First, contrary to Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1999), who find very moderate and quite similar wage effects of both
general and firm-specific training, our wage effect for general training is
somewhat higher and exceeds the corresponding effect for firm-specific training.
Second, contrary to studies like Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002), Ju¨rges and
Schneider (2006), and Kuckulenz and Maier (2006), we can only partially
conclude that wage effects of continuous training programs are returns to
unobserved characteristics rather than returns to training. Third, we consider our
results in line with Gerfin (2004), who can also discriminate between the wage
effects of two types of training (work-related and firm-sponsored training) using
Swiss individual data.
However, it should be noted that the heterogeneity of the international evidence
on the wage effects of continuous training can at least partially be attributed to
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specific institutional differences between countries. For example, the Dual System
of vocational education, which can be described as a front-loaded system, is specific
to only a few countries like Germany or Switzerland. As a result, different wage
effects of continuous training between countries may at least partially be caused by
different arrangements with respect to the underlying system of apprenticeship
training.
Our above stated interpretation that firm-specific training does not contribute to
increasing wages, because firms use this tool to adjust to new job requirements,
deserves some additional research. For example, if selection into training
substantially depended on technological and organizational innovations, the
decision whether or not to participate in specific training could be considered as
a push rather than a pull decision. As a consequence, firm characteristics should be
paid more attention in future work, when estimating the wage effects of continuous
training.
Given the evidence provided so far, the influence of continuous training on wages
is rather modest. However, there seem to be some indications that training has a
more pronounced positive influence on promotions (e.g. Pannenberg 1997; Krueger
and Rouse 1998) and on wages in future firms (e.g. Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998;
Booth and Bryan 2005). These results are consistent with our interpretation that
general training is more likely to support the career of employees than firm-specific
training.
Finally, it should be mentioned that we have not explicitly addressed the problem
of different time durations of the training courses in our study. Since we examined
the wage effects of continuous training that took place within a time span of 3 years,
it would be interesting to obtain more precise information about the returns to
training courses with a different length of time spell. In the present study, we were
not able to address this problem adequately because our focus lied on disentangling
the wage effects of general from firm-specific training. Additionally accounting for
the length of time spells of general and firm-specific training would have
substantially reduced our treated individuals. For example, we would have had to
estimate the wage effects for specifically trained workers who participated in a
course that lasted only 1 month and compare this effect with the corresponding
effect for those workers who participated in a course that lasted 6 months, and so
on. Since our groups of the treated are much smaller than the control groups (e.g.
about 1/10 for specific training), examining the wage effects of continuous training
for different time spells would surely have contributed to additionally decrease the
number of the treated relative to the controls. As a consequence, we will leave an
interesting question open for future research.
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Appendix
Table 6 Description of variables
Variable Description
Dependent variable
Log wage (ln W) Natural logarithm of individual’s recent gross earnings
Individual characteristics
Years of education (S) Years of individual’s education
Unmarried (UNMARRIED) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual is
unmarried
Age (AGE) Age of the individual
West-German (WEST) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual currently
lives in West-Germany
Nationality (NATION) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual is a
German citizen
Job-related factors
Continuous training (CT) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual has
participated in continuous training within the past three years
Continuous general training (GT) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual has
participated in continuous general training within the past
three years
Continuous firm-specific
training (FST)
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual has
participated in continuous firm-specific training within the
past 3 years
Previous continuous training (PT) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual has
participated in continuous training within the 3 years
prior to 2000
Fixed-term Employment (FTE) Dummy variable indicating whether individual is
temporarily or permanently employed
Tenure (TEN) Years of individual’s intra-firm job tenure
Overtime work (O_TIME) Number of hours of overtime work per month
Adequate job (AD_JOB) Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual is
working in his original job
Occupational status Six dummy variables for managers (MAN), highly skilled
white collar workers (HSWC), skilled white collar workers
(SWC), skilled blue collar workers (SBC), unskilled white
collar workers (UWC), and unskilled blue collar workers
(UBC)
Regional dummies Sixteen dummy variables indicating the federal state in which
the household resides
Sector dummies Eleven dummy variables indicating the sector affiliation
of the firm
Firm size dummies Six dummy variables indicating different firm size classes
(\5 employees, 5–19 employees, 20–99 employees,
100–199 employees, 200–1,999 employees, 2,000 and more
employees)
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Min–max Mean Std. dev.
Gross monthly wage (W) 720–13,600 3,140.81 1,523.31
Log wage (ln W) 6.58–9.52 7.96 0.43
Continuous training (CT) 0–1 0.24 0.43
Continuous general training (GT) 0–1 0.16 0.37
Continuous firm-specific training (FST) 0–1 0.08 0.28
Age (AGE) 23–65 43.34 8.83
Years of education (S) 7–18 12.19 2.49
Unmarried (UNMARRIED) 0–1 0.16 0.37
Nationality (NATION) 0–1 0.89 0.31
Tenure (TEN) 0–51.4 12.47 9.67
Adequate job (AD_JOB) 0–1 0.57 0.50
Fixed-term Employment (FTE) 0–1 0.03 0.18
Overtime work (O_TIME) 0–23.1 2.98 4.06
Managers (MAN) 0–1 0.03 0.17
High skilled white collar workers (HSWC) 0–1 0.22 0.41
Skilled white collar workers (SWC) 0–1 0.17 0.38
Skilled blue collar workers (SBC) 0–1 0.37 0.48
Unskilled blue collar workers (UBC) 0–1 0.17 0.37
Unskilled white collar workers (UWC) 0–1 0.04 0.19
West-German (WEST) 0–1 0.78 0.42
The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent
regression analysis. The sample size is N = 1,751
Source German Socio Economic Panel (wave 2004), own calculations
Table 8 OLS estimates for the explanatory variables not displayed in Table 2
Dependent variable ln W
CONST 6.961*** (106.06)
UNMARRIED –0.080*** (–4.63)
NATION 0.012 (0.62)
WEST 0.364*** (3.47)
FTE –0.096*** (–2.78)
AD_JOB 0.005 (0.35)
O_TIME 0.015*** (8.02)
Sector dummies Yes
Occupational status
Manager (MAN) 0.862*** (15.10)
High skilled white collar worker (HSWC) 0.501*** (16.76)
Skilled white collar worker (SWC) 0.257*** (10.02)
Skilled blue collar worker (SBC) 0.118*** (5.81)
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Table 8 continued
Dependent variable ln W
Unskilled white collar worker (UWC) 0.119*** (2.57)
Firm size
5–19 employees 0.074** (2.04)
20–99 employees 0.119*** (3.02)
100–199 employees 0.189*** (4.73)
200–1,999 employees 0.212*** (5.79)
2,000 and more employees 0.260*** (6.92)
Regional dummies Yes
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The coefficients are estimated by OLS. The
values in parentheses represent the robust t-statistics using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of
the coefficients. The estimates refer to Eq. 1, Panel B. The reference group for occupational status is the
group of unskilled blue collar workers (UBC). The reference group for the firm size dummies are small
establishments employing less than five workers
Source German Socio Economic Panel (wave 2004), own calculations
Table 9 Probit estimates of the propensity scores
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Dependent variable CT GT FST
PT 0.992*** (12.91) 1.037*** (11.90) 0.771*** (7.26)
S 0.037** (2.04) 0.048** (2.36) 0.009 (0.35)
AGE –0.021*** (–4.64) –0.022*** (–4.37) –0.014** (–2.24)
SK 0.314*** (2.78) 0.331** (2.49) 0.240 (1.55)
HS 0.652*** (4.52) 0.610*** (3.64) 0.643*** (3.23)
NATION 0.215 (1.57) 0.112 (0.72) 0.307 (1.53)
CONST –1.653*** (–4.49) –2.179*** (–4.76) –1.682*** (–3.52)
Firm size dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
LR test 411.17*** 322.77*** 184.49***
Pseudo-R2 0.212 0.218 0.194
N 1,751 1,604 1,443
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The coefficients are estimated by the probit
maximum likelihood method. The values in parentheses represent the z-statistics. The variable SK is a
dummy variable indicating skilled work, which is formed by the two variables SWC and SBC. The
variable HS is a dummy variable indicating high skilled work, which is formed by the two variables
HSWC and MAN. The reference category is US formed by USBC and USWC. The LR (Likelihood
Ratio) test and Pseudo-R2 indicate the estimation quality of the equations. N indicates sample size. The
number of observations for firm-specific training declines by 29 observations compared to the number
given in Table 2 as one of the regional dummies causes perfectly predicted failure. The explanatory
variables are described in Tables 6 and 7
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
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Table 10 Matching estimators for an alternative specification of the dependent variables general and
firm-specific training
Training form General training Firm-specific training
Treatment variable GT FST
Matching estimator
Nearest neighbour ATE 0.055 (0.077) 0.092 (0.147)
ATT 0.081* (0.048) 0.128 (0.095)
MDiD 0.062** (0.028) 0.059 (0.040)
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The values in parentheses represent the
(bootstrapped) standard errors of the coefficients. In these specifications, GT is defined as continuous
training that is completely transferable to other employers, while FST is defined as continuous training
that is not transferable at all. Treated observations are 106 for general training and 32 for firm-specific
training. The number of observations N in the nearest neighbour matching is 1,402 (general training) and
1,301 (firm-specific training), respectively. For the MDiD estimations N is 358 (general training) and 122
(firm-specific training), respectively
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
Table 11 Matching estimators for different forms of continuous training on wages using information
from the least recent training
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Treatment variable CT GT FST
Matching estimator
Nearest neighbour ATE 0.040 (0.026) 0.070* (0.037) 0.051 (0.050)
ATT 0.018 (0.036) 0.048 (0.040) 0.027 (0.051)
Kernel ATE 0.053** (0.024) 0.090*** (0.034) 0.064* (0.038)
ATT 0.042* (0.023) 0.049** (0.025) 0.051 (0.033)
Local linear regression ATE 0.042** (0.020) 0.058* (0.031) 0.061 (0.048)
ATT 0.033 (0.023) 0.035 (0.024) 0.025 (0.033)
MDiD 0.044*** (0.016) 0.049** (0.020) 0.044* (0.026)
Treated 306 199 107
N 1,631 1,524 1,422
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The values in parentheses represent the
(bootstrapped) standard errors of the coefficients. Treated observations on the common support are
indicated in the table. N indicates the sample size. For further explanations see the comments on Tables 4
and 5. Referring to the MDiD estimates N is 807 (continuous training), 588 (general training) and 387
(firm-specific training), respectively
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
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Table 12 MDiD estimators resulting from different matching procedures
Training form Continuous training General training Firm-specific training
Treatment variable CT GT FST
Kernel 0.058*** (0.013) 0.064*** (0.015) 0.043** (0.021)
Local Linear Regression 0.033* (0.018) 0.048** (0.020) 0.035 (0.029)
N (Kernel/LLR) 1,746/673 1,587/470 1,357/265
*/**/*** Indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The values in parentheses represent the
standard errors of the coefficients. N indicates sample size
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 2000, 2004), own calculations
Table 13 Yearly wage development of training participants, non-participants and matched controls
Year Participants Non-participants Matched controls
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1997 2,667 1,225 2,314 946 2,540 1,084
1998 2,813 1,241 2,374 1,015 2,631 1,183
1999 2,945 1,318 2,415 1,013 2,651 1,143
2000 3,166 1,356 2,592 1,155 2,855 1,298
2004 3,753 1,584 2,944 1,450 3,261 1,615
The matched non-participants are drawn from the nearest neighbour matching for CT, allowing for
replacement and using the four closest matches
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 1997–2004), own calculations
1'000
1'500
2'000
2'500
3'000
3'500
4'000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
M
ea
n 
m
on
th
ly
 in
co
m
e 
in
 E
ur
o
participants
non-participants
matched controls
Fig. 1 Yearly wage development of training participants, non-participants and matched controls.
Note The matched non-participants are drawn from the nearest neighbour matching for CT, allowing for
replacement and using the four closest matches.
Source German Socio Economic Panel (waves 1997–2004), own calculations
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